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ABSTRACT: Science communication emerges from social contexts in which the value of popular support for 
science and technology (S&T) is presumed. This article does not dispute the assertion that S&T is “good” but 
does assume that people should make free and informed choices about it, explored here using nanotechnology. 
This problematizes the purpose of science communication and suggests the need to reconceptualize science 
literacy as having critical dimensions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Science communication is motivated by rather diverse goals. One set of these goals concerns 
the empowerment of “ordinary” (that is, other-than-expert) people to make wise choices 
regarding the adoption of particular forms of science and technology (S&T) into their everyday 
lives, either as consumers (through purchasing decisions) or as citizens (by influencing policy). 
By emphasizing empowerment rather than predetermination of choices, these goals are 
directed toward enhancing “bottom-up” decision-making capacity. The second set of science 
communication goals usually concerns the promotion of S&T more generally and is more “top-
down” in nature. These goals commonly presuppose that S&T is generally of benefit to 
society, both economically and in other ways, such as through the capacity for improving 
people’s general health and welfare or by contributing to environmental sustainability. (More 
cynically, top-down forms of science communication can also serve the interests of society’s 
elites, including S&T industry interests.) Using nanotechnology as a case for study, this article 
explores the question of whether these two sets of goals are ethically compatible or 
incompatible, and under what circumstances; it also introduces the concept of “critical science 
literacy” in the hope of refocusing the “science literacy” debate. 
 Over the past several decades, discussions of science communication have moved from 
a “deficit model” in which “the problem” of science communication is defined in terms of 
knowledge deficits that need to be addressed to a “discourse” or “engagement” model in which 
it is widely recognized that citizens in democracies lack opportunities to talk through issues 
associated with science and otherwise involve themselves with developments in science and 
science policy. What sorts of outcomes these opportunities should produce is an open question, 
however. Reliance on new forms of science communication suggested by the “engagement” 
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model does not necessarily resolve the problem of purpose. In 2010, British scholar and 
prominent proponent of the “public engagement” approach Brian Wynne resigned from the 
steering group of a significant UK Food Standards Agency effort to “engage” people in 
discussions of genetic modification of foods, reportedly describing the project as largely a 
propaganda effort on behalf of the biotechnology industry (Vidal, 2010). This illustrates that it 
is motivation, not just method, which should concern us. 
 Communicating about science and technology (S&T) with non-technical publics has 
many purposes, ranging from (on the one hand) providing information and education that help 
enable economic survival in a highly-developed economy and that empower citizens to 
participate in identifying wise management policy to (on the other hand) achieving persuasive 
goals designed to get people to accept (or, sometimes, to reject) particular forms of S&T. 
While some observers assume S&T is always “good,” and therefore science communication 
designed to enhance its acceptance by any means available is likewise always “good,” history 
is clearly replete with cases where this has not necessarily been the case. Scholars have 
documented innumerable such cases with respect to human rights, the most notorious of which 
are certainly the infamous Nazi war crimes; the history of human subjects research is littered 
with other cases where even well-intentioned researchers ignored important issues of human 
rights, and much investment in S&T has certainly gone to improving weaponry that can kill 
more and more people—even if done in the interests of “keeping the peace.” More subtly, S&T 
may influence social life in arguably less-than-ideal ways, as the Luddite movement claimed. 
And our present environmental challenges, up to and including global climate change 
processes, are often directly associated with S&T: we consume energy and produce carbon 
dioxide in a thousand daily ways that were not even imagined a century ago. 
 So, of course, while some observers always see good in S&T, others are always 
suspicious of it, not only for its (albeit largely unintended, the Nazi example notwithstanding) 
bad impacts on human beings and their social lives, but also because of its environmental 
consequences (also often largely unintended). All of this creates a complicated knot of diverse, 
often implicit, motivations and purposes associated with science communication that this 
article attempts to go some way toward untangling. In so doing, I try to begin with an 
essentially agnostic position as to whether S&T is—on average—more good than bad, 
especially in specific cases. However, I do confess here at the outset to a personal belief that 
the benefits of S&T, taken as a whole, generally outweigh both its costs and its risks, but I also 
confess to a conviction that S&T must be wisely and cautiously managed to operate in 
society’s best interests and a strong belief that the critics of S&T are not always and 
necessarily wrong, especially with regard to social and environmental consequences.  
 An integral part of the very definition of human existence (present in the concept of the 
“tool-using” human), S&T does have the broadest possible range of ethical implications. On 
the negative side, even where the question is not one of blatantly trampling on ordinary human 
rights or rampantly polluting the environment—the bad implications that most people can 
readily recognize—there are many other issues of what needs and interests different kinds of 
S&T serve (who benefits), who is most exposed to the risks associated with S&T 
(environmental and worker justice), and which S&T is most worthy of investment, given 
limited societal resources (which science should be privileged). These distributional issues are 
also ethical in nature—and nanotechnology is very clearly a prime example of all three of these 
distributional questions.  
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 Along with its almost unarguable benefits, then, S&T routinely brings negative 
consequences that are unintended, not only environmental in nature but also regularly 
involving direct impacts on human health and changes in lifestyles that can be bad as well as 
good (for example, in the familiar case of automobile use); community and even societal 
sustainability (given global climate change); and other quality-of-life issues (including the 
depersonalization and fragmentation characteristic of modern life, which is difficult to neatly 
separate from our technological world). And there are other cases, such as embryonic stem cell 
research, that present ethical challenges primarily for particular segments of society (in that 
case, those holding particular religious beliefs). Achieving appropriate balance between the 
moral objections of one segment of society (whether a tiny minority or a clear majority) and 
the interests and beliefs of other segments—or of “society” or “humankind” as a whole—is 
certainly particularly challenging and controversial.  
 Learning about S&T, especially in formal settings where it can be documented by 
course completion, certificates, and degrees, enhances job prospects for millions around the 
globe; S&T boosts our personal health and welfare in hundreds if not thousands of ways; S&T 
economic sectors also provide new investment opportunities (and make money for colleges and 
universities, institutions that—in an ideal world—make invaluable contributions to the quality 
of life that go well beyond the direct impact of S&T on society, and yet represent a set of 
special interests even so). It is therefore worth stressing that the ethical issues and other issues 
of wise management of S&T do not solely concern avoidance of the negative or morally 
contentious aspects, but can also concern the fostering and distribution of its positive ones. Yet 
this can be contentious as well.  
 The current vaccination controversy is one particularly interesting example. Is it right 
for a majority belief (i.e., in vaccination’s benefits), even if correct, to dictate individual 
medical choices among a minority who reject that belief, or do people have a right to their 
objections, even if scientifically incorrect? What if the individual choices (as in vaccination) 
impinge on the rights of the majority (in this case, to be collectively less susceptible to certain 
diseases)? And is it possible in this case that if the minority were “properly” educated about the 
underlying science, they would embrace vaccination rather than reject it? On the other hand, is 
it even possible, at least hypothetically and in limited circumstances, that the minority could 
somehow turn out to be scientifically correct and the majority wrong? One doesn’t always have 
a crystal ball about how these things will evolve; controversy over the fluoridation of water, for 
example, continues to this day. Such is a quandary for science communication practice, in 
which it is often not possible to wait until the philosophers, the courts, and the science itself 
catch up to everyday decision making! 
 The science literacy “movement,” which can be traced back to at least the late 1950s 
(DeBoer, 1990), is a reflection of the observation that people are often called upon to embrace 
or reject personal behaviors, social policies, and political candidates on the basis of S&T 
considerations, from evaluation of energy or healthcare management alternatives to making 
conservation, environmental protection, and land use choices, to climate change mitigation, to 
the provision of support for basic research or for particular activities or programs such as 
agriculture or the space program, to adhering to a healthy diet and lifestyle. It seems reasonable 
to insist that wise choices often require some level of basic understanding of the S&T involved. 
These choices clearly impact the nature of local economies as well as both the quality of 
human life and the health of the environment. In democratic societies, citizen engagement in 
these decisions seems desirable, perhaps even essential. Individuals in contemporary societies 
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are regularly called upon to make lifestyle adjustments or buy products sold as improving their 
health or that of the environment, requiring them to be intelligent consumers of such claims—
as well as voting citizens who have a hand (even if indirectly, through elections) in policy 
decisions. 
 The notion that “the problem” of “public understanding of science” consists of 
knowledge deficits—the so-called “deficit model” (Ziman, 1991) of science communication— 
assumes that the goal of public communication about science is to remedy observed 
information or knowledge deficiencies, with the implicit purpose of yielding better decisions 
(often expected to take the form of more support for science). This view privileges a utilitarian 
perspective on both science itself and science communication, with a positive outcome 
envisioned: the goal is to create a better world for all, through science (or, as General Electric’s 
famous tagline has it, “We bring good things to life”). However, there is only a weak 
relationship between levels of knowledge and people’s positions on S&T adoption (Sturgis & 
Allum, 2004). Having more information and knowledge may well improve S&T decision 
making, but it does not predict the direction of those decisions particularly well.   
 Despite this, many forms of science communication—those that are more persuasive, 
even propagandistic, in nature—are either salesmanship per se or at least seek particular 
outcomes strategically chosen with financial and other interests in mind. Corporate interests 
want consumers to purchase their S&T products, from cell phones to pharmaceuticals. 
Particular economic sectors want public support, both “moral” and financial, for their S&T 
endeavors. The non-profit world is hardly immune from these dynamics. Universities and 
research institutes, as well as individual scientists and engineers, want recognition and prestige, 
which is often assumed to make fundraising and successful grantsmanship easier. 
Environmental interests and other advocacy groups (e.g., professional organizations, consumer 
advocacy groups, health-promotion agencies, and so on) seek public support for their activities 
and for the policies they often exist to promote, and they likewise make use of strategic science 
communication to do so. Dorothy Nelkin called her well-known book Selling Science (1995) 
for good reason; even though her subject in this work was primarily journalistic treatment of 
science, rather than marketing efforts, the goal of “selling” pervades much of our 
communication about science in either sphere.  
 Sometimes these two sets of goals—democratic ones and strategic ones—seem to 
converge. Automobile companies developing and marketing fuel-efficient vehicles, for 
example, are marketing products they hope will generate profits, while at the same time they 
are (at least arguably) helping empower people to reduce their carbon emissions and thus 
mitigate climate change effects. This duality extends beyond the corporate world; advocacy 
groups of all kinds may seek positive change in our use of S&T, but they also need resources 
to continue their work. This convergence is often problematic, or can be more apparent than 
real: the term “greenwashing” captures the perception on the part of some observers that 
organizations (e.g., those in the corporate world, but also others) can and do expend effort to 
appear environmentally responsible when in fact they are not. And there are myriad other ways 
in which pursuing market advantages can have unintended consequences that are not always in 
the long-term collective interests of society, as numerous critics of our modern “consumerist” 
societies have pointed out.  
 All of this raises many practical ethical questions. Is it ever acceptable to use 
manipulative or propagandistic techniques to promote policies, activities, and products that 
support the public good? How can anyone decide when this is justified—which choices are in 
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fact in society’s interests, and which are not? Where does hype end and socially progressive 
advocacy begin? Or are strategic communication approaches always at root manipulative and 
therefore always at odds with the ideals of democratic governance, which imagine a free actor 
freely making choices based on access to authentic, truthful information?  
 Nanotechnology, promoted as the “next great wave” of technological development, is a 
contemporary case in point. Many believed that nanotechnology would follow a rocky course 
more or less parallel to that of biotechnology, in terms of public acceptance. This undoubtedly 
encouraged unprecedented public investment in social science research about effective 
strategic communication, from which science communication scholars around the world have 
benefited. The investment has resulted in remarkably little direct confrontation with the ethical 
issues involved, however. Whether biotechnology, nanotechnology, or any other technology 
should be embraced uncritically may depend in part on whether one believes that the benefits 
consistently and reliably outweigh the harms. However, the ethical principles relevant to 
science communication may be relevant regardless of utilitarian concerns (i.e., regardless of 
whether the particular S&T in question is “good for us” or not) to the extent they tend to erode 
or foster individual decision-making autonomy, a freedom generally recognized as a hallmark 
of democratic governance. 
 Further, determining which S&T is “good” and which is “bad” inevitably involves the 
application of value-driven choice. Thus the question of what forms of science communication 
are “ethical” is to some extent inseparable from the question of whether, and when, it is 
acceptable to impose one set of values over another. Even posing this question seems prima 
facie inconsistent with democratic practice. And at a minimum, promotional communication 
that seems one-sided or insincere can simply turn people off and may backfire, just as some 
many anti-smoking and anti-drug campaigns have been observed to have backfired. Wary and 
wise members of today’s S&T-rich societies are understandably, perhaps even justifiably, 
cynical about many of these arguments, and messages that do not deal with risks as well as 
benefits may not be well-received. 
 Even if we could safely assume, strictly for the sake of argument, that in the long run 
S&T (including biotech and nanotech) can and will consistently bring important benefits by 
improving health and nutrition, reducing hunger, making life more enjoyable, and facilitating 
sustainability, that it only rarely involves important risks, that these risks can be managed 
successfully, and that people will believe our promotional messages and these will not turn 
them against us, there is the additional issue of whether some forms of persuasive, promotional 
communications serve to reduce autonomy by manipulating people’s decision making, even if 
“for their own good.” It may perhaps be less unethical to coerce and manipulate where the 
benefits to humanity are tangible and assured, but it is still ethically problematic. 
 While nanotechnology shows little tendency to follow in the footsteps (so to speak) of 
biotechnology, in terms of public response, that hardly means there are no ethics to consider — 
particularly considering that some forms of nanotech, some of the time, certainly appear to 
carry some tangible potential for harm to health and/or environment (see, e.g., Shatkin, 
2008)—ironically, perhaps more tangibly than biotech was known to carry at a parallel stage in 
its introduction.  
 This article attempts to provide a foundational exploration for considering the question 
of what kind of ethical thinking should apply to science communication practice in the 
particular case of nanotechnology, the latest big new trend in S&T development and one 
widely predicted to transform society generally and the economy in particular. Whether or not 
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these predictions are excessively “hyped,” and whether or not the anticipation of bad effects 
turns out to be accurate, nanotech does provide a useful case for asking (and perhaps partially 
answering) the question of whether democratic and strategic goals for science communication 
can live in harmony or are necessarily incompatible. Of course, this inquiry takes place in a 
context in which the jury is still out on just exactly what the benefits and harms of 
nanotechnology might be—but then this is almost always the case when new S&T is being 
rolled out for public scrutiny. 
2. BOTTOM-UP COMMUNICATION: ALWAYS DEMOCRATIC? 
In our technology-driven societies, some choices about technology are heavily constrained. It 
is often difficult for an individual person or family to decide they want to utilize mass 
transportation more heavily, for example, or to use more alternative energy, or to walk rather 
than drive a car to complete everyday errands, unless the local infrastructure supports this—
and in most cases, it does not. Yet, at the same time, there are other instances in which 
individuals are called upon to make choices regarding which science and technology (S&T) 
they should adopt, and which S&T they might want to reject—or at least which they might 
prefer to avoid embracing. Many, perhaps most, of these choices are implicit, expressed 
primarily as purchasing decisions or occasionally as voting decisions to the extent campaigns 
for particular candidates or proposals focus on S&T. Of course, as we all know, purchasing 
decisions, as well as voting decisions, can be made thoughtfully, or they can be made 
impulsively. Indeed, one goal of science communication might be thought of as encouraging 
thoughtful choices and discouraging impulsive ones.  
 People may make these decisions for a very broad range of reasons, of which cost (or 
risk) versus benefit ratios are only one example. Organic foods, for instance, may be purchased 
because they are believed to be superior (that is, to carry specific benefits to health), despite 
being more expensive. Or they may be purchased because of a wish to support a certain 
lifestyle and approach to food production among farmers that some consumers specifically 
associate (rightly or wrongly) with the production of organic foods and which they find worth 
supporting regardless of greater costs and even where other consumer benefits could be 
marginal. Further, utilitarian arguments like these are not the only ones that may be relevant. 
Underlying beliefs about the natural order—whether seen as an issue of environment and 
ecology or as something “God” (or “a god”) gave us—can also figure in. This is, of course, 
only one example among many.  
 Individuals make these decisions both as consumers and as citizens. As consumers, 
they determine which products to buy, albeit as already noted they are most commonly faced 
with a highly-constrained set of alternatives (see Schibeci, Harwood, & Dietrich, 2006 for a 
case-based discussion of institutional constraints on involvement as citizens). Free-market 
enthusiasts may imagine that consumer choices are all-powerful, but this is unrealistic. Even in 
the world of pharmaceuticals, consumers are presented only with those choices that the market 
provides— thus the phenomenon of “orphan drugs” for diseases that are not widely-enough 
distributed to support “big pharma” investment. And this is not to mention the pervasively 
propagandistic influence of advertising and marketing on the choices we actually make, or the 
more subtle influence of media representations more generally—including the consumerist 
values embedded in both news and entertainment, as well as advertising, that our children then 
internalize. Even so, consumer choices can be powerful, collectively; consumer boycotts 
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matter, and consumer popularity encourages further investment, whether in organic food 
production or in (say) “smarter” cell phone technology. 
 So, while consumer choice may be a relatively limited and constrained form of 
autonomy, it is a form of autonomy nevertheless, and it does have the potential to influence the 
decision making of larger entities and institutions such as corporations and government 
agencies. Yet as citizens, by contrast, individuals are conceptualized as in some sense acting 
more purposively on behalf of society and in the service of broader societal values—trying to 
make wise decisions about S&T on behalf of society, decisions that are more conscious, 
potentially more influential, and perhaps less constrained, or at least constrained in different 
ways, than the decisions they might make acting solely as individual consumers, concerned 
primarily about their own needs and gratifications and choosing from among products already 
available in the marketplace. People acting as consumers, in other words, often appear less 
autonomous, less powerful, less deliberate, and perhaps even less important than people acting 
as citizens.  
 Individuals acting as consumers commonly make (or decline to make) purchases of 
discrete items—in the case of nanotechnology, products such as clothing or sporting goods or 
even, in a commonly imagined future scenario, food products and medicines that may be nano-
enhanced—as opposed to individuals acting as citizens who support (or oppose) policies about 
regulating the risks (of nano or of other S&T), policies that are adopted or rejected at the 
societal level. Individuals also act as consumers of specialized services such as medical care 
that may also be nano-enhanced (Priest, 2009), but again their choices of discrete elements 
(which medication to take, or not, which doctor to visit, or not, and so on) seem of a different 
character from their influence as citizens over larger-scale questions about how medicine is 
regulated or organized or how health care is funded or what research is supported, however 
limited that influence might be in a particular case and on the part of any individual person.  
 Citizen power, then, most readily comes to mind when larger-scale decisions are being 
made, e.g., whether to make policies that encourage the diffusion of alternative energy 
technology or further regulate existing energy technology such as coal burning or nuclear 
power generation. In such cases citizens often exercise their power primarily through others—
donating money to groups that are pressuring politicians or other officials or voting for 
particular candidates that they see as furthering their goals. Presumably politicians, as well as 
bureaucrats, are responsive to citizen opinion as measured by opinion polls, although political 
scientists have sometimes argued that this responsiveness is not as strong as an observer might 
imagine. Citizens can also work to form new organizations to lobby political bodies (e.g., 
members of legislatures or other governing bodies) on behalf of issues they believe are 
important. Employees, acting as citizens, form unions or professional or trade groups—which 
in turn may work on behalf of workplace health and safety through negotiating with 
corporations and lobbying government officials, as well as politicians and political bodies, to 
improve working conditions, including issues involving health and safety that may be 
associated with nanotechnology in the workplace or nano’s environmental effects. In some 
cases and in some societies, they also vote on science policy issues directly through various 
forms of referenda.  
 Generally, then, individuals acting as consumers are conceptualized as being relatively 
less autonomous (more constrained) than individuals acting as citizens, but in either case they 
are conceived of as making individual-level decisions that, taken as a collective whole, 
ultimately (in the aggregate) influence society’s choices with respect to the diffusion of 
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technology. Both citizens and consumers have at least limited autonomy and some power to 
direct or constrain (in turn) society’s adoption of new technology, and yet in both cases the 
power does not appear absolute: whether people are acting as consumers or citizens, 
completely upsetting the status quo through collective action is an unlikely outcome (although 
this does happen, whether through violent revolution or successful but largely peaceful social 
movements). The current public engagement movement for S&T seeks to encourage this kind 
of (peaceful) citizen involvement and the creation of new forums for public consultation such 
as consensus conferences, thus supporting by improvement rather than directly challenging the 
existing structure. Rather than completely upset the apple cart, then, the public engagement 
movement seeks to better balance the information equation by enhancing the effectiveness of 
bottom-up communication.  
 In the normal course of events, of course, citizens are heavily constrained by the 
political system that surrounds them and the need to make a living (e.g., if mass transportation 
is not available to them, they will likely continue to support the construction of the new 
highways needed for them to get to work in a reasonable time), and can only rather indirectly 
and long-term (if at all) influence the availability of true technological alternatives, let alone 
the priorities of scientific research (although the contemporary emphasis on medical research, 
at least in the US, probably represents an indirect reflection of what most concerns most of the 
population, in terms of scientific progress). Realistically, citizens cannot generally and 
unilaterally control the policy choices that are available to them, but can only choose across a 
limited range of choices, just like consumers choosing from among a limited range of kinds of 
canned soup. Nevertheless, citizens do have power; like the power of consumers, it is at its 
peak when it involves organized collective action, something the public engagement movement 
argument attempts to foster, albeit within limits and under controlled circumstances unlikely to 
erupt into violence.1  
 Collective action is conceptualized here, for the sake of simplicity, as an aggregate of 
individual decisions, but power is enhanced by acting together, and collective power is not 
simply the additive total of individual power. People situate their own opinions, and express 
them or not, with respect to an environment in which they are constantly projecting what other 
people think—and might think of them (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Wyatt, Kim, & Katz, 2000). 
They respond to the perceived “climate” of collective opinion, mentally positioning their own 
views in response. And motivated individuals within society often actively attempt to enlist 
others to their points of view, which also contributes to opinion and action processes that 
transcend individual-level phenomena. Collective action is not always simply the sum of a 
series of individual actions (or non-actions), in other words. 2  
 Even so, despite the over-simplification involved, both consumers and citizens (that is, 
individuals acting as either consumers or citizens) can be thought of as making largely 
independent individual decisions that add up to a societal preference, whether expressed by 
buying or (say) by behaving or by voting. Both citizens and consumers make use of 
                                                
1  Of course, one could argue that the public engagement movement provides just the sort of “steam escape 
valve” that keeps society from further collapsing, or exploding, and in this way supports the status quo rather 
than facilitating deeper change. I do not really dispute this argument, but to pursue it here would take the 
reader too far afield. I would personally still rather have more public engagement than less. 
2  This constitutes an important limitation of the “psychometric” paradigm for risk perception, in which the role 
of values and preferences in individual-level decision making is relatively well understood, but the role of 
collective processes tends to be ignored. 
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information available to them in making those decisions. We usually think of science 
communication as providing these individuals with the information that they need to do so, and 
thus facilitating their independence and autonomy in either role. Yet truly disinterested 
information, suffice it to say, can be hard to come by. 
3. TOP-DOWN COMMUNICATION: ALWAYS PROPAGANDA? 
While “bottom-up” empowerment is a goal consistent with an idealized view of a pluralistic, 
democratic society in which individuals acting as consumers but especially as citizens drive (or 
at least influence) societal decision making, much of the information that is supposed to 
empower these individuals comes from a “top-down” direction—that is, much of it is 
generated and disseminated by (at least relatively) powerful, elite institutions within society. 
This means government agencies, corporate and industrial entities, political parties, influential 
advocacy groups (here even including unions and other workers’ groups, to the extent these 
have power and resources), and in the special case of S&T, universities, professional groups, 
and research institutes as well. This is, of course, also the nature of pluralistic democracies in 
the controversial version sometimes described as “elite pluralism” and generally attributed to 
the work of V. O. Key (1961) in which democracy is seen as coexisting with concentrated 
institutional power. However, unlike the presentation in most basic civics texts, this essay 
seeks to unpack a little more thoroughly the role of information and communication in all of 
this. 
 Even if some—or, for the sake of argument, let’s even say many—of these powerful 
institutional agents and their members and employees have the interests of the broader society 
at heart, institutional communication tends to serve the interests of the institutions that produce 
it (Gandy, 1982). And institutional control over information is particularly acute in cases where 
the subject is specialized and technical, as in nanotechnology. This might not be an inherently 
disempowering dynamic, vis-à-vis non-expert publics, but it certainly presents challenges for 
truly democratic (that is, bottom-up) decision making: the information that is supposed to 
empower autonomous citizens of a democracy to make good choices is not, by and large, 
disinterested information. Therein lies the nut of the problem, so caveat emptor. And this is a 
special problem for S&T because arriving at the scientific “truth” is such a complex and messy 
process all on its own, and because scientific information is often inaccessible to most citizens 
(i.e., it can be incomprehensible and indigestible in its original form, as well as hard to come 
by).  
 Generally speaking, “top-down” communication efforts, those planned by a particular 
organization or group with some degree of resources and political or social influence (e.g., the 
government or a major corporation or advocacy group), are strategic communication efforts to 
varying degrees, undertaken for a specific, conscious, persuasive purpose. Communication that 
is authentically intended to encourage unconstrained, bottom-up decision making is not the 
type of communication that we ordinarily refer to as either “top-down” or strategic in nature. 
However, this distinction is rarely as clear in practice. The actors involved in creating 
messages and disseminating information about S&T—the science communication 
professionals, that is—are usually either journalists, public relations or advertising 
professionals, or “public information” specialists. If journalists, they may be assumed to be 
autonomous to a degree, but they actually get much of their information from sources 
representing elite institutions and they are in practice constrained in a myriad of other very 
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important ways (Shoemaker & Reese, 1995). For example, many of the most influential of 
these journalists work for large media corporations with their own financial bottom lines to 
worry about and having many interests in common with those of other large corporations, a 
point critical media scholars have been making for many years. 
 Further, the journalists are outnumbered by the public relations and advertising folk, 
especially in today’s world where the news business is being dramatically “restructured” and 
science-savvy journalism appears at risk of becoming a scarce luxury. New media produce a 
lot of seemingly new messages, but the vast majority of them are repackaged from information 
disseminated by the same old players. As professionals, public relations and advertising 
specialists are governed by their own codes of ethics, of course, just as journalists are 
(although compliance is naturally not perfect in either case). The distinction seems clear; the 
messages they create are sent out on behalf of particular interests—those of whoever is paying 
for the work—whereas journalism is supposed to be carried out on behalf of society. Again, 
caveat emptor, but at least advertising messages are generally recognized as such, whereas 
public relations and journalism have a generally symbiotic relationship that makes many 
observers uneasy. It seems an inherent conflict for journalists to be dependent on public 
relations people for story ideas and information, but they are—and all the more so in cases of 
specialized topics such as S&T or medicine, including nanotechnology.  
 This leaves public information professionals as the only potentially disinterested 
disseminators of S&T information. Perhaps theirs is indeed a “softer” bias, more benign from 
society’s point of view. Most public information specialists tend to work outside of the for-
profit corporate world. However, they also represent special interests; they work for 
government agencies, universities, or professional associations, none of which are actually 
disinterested at all. This became all too obvious in the case of government when the 
dissemination by the US Office of National Drug Control Policy of video press releases 
opposing illegal drug use, releases prepared by an outside public relations firm, were ruled 
illegal by the General Accounting Office and helped prompt a Congressional Research Service 
report that attempted to clarify the fine line between “information” and “propaganda” (Kosar, 
2005).  
4. THE DILEMMA FOR SCIENCE COMMUNICATION  
Clearly, if S&T always brought only unmitigated good, and if people were always wise, then 
providing people with increased communication, information, and education about S&T, both 
in general and specific to cases of newly emerging technology such as biotechnology and 
nanotechnology, would result in people’s making “wise” (that is, from this viewpoint, pro-
S&T) decisions—whether this information is provided merely strategically or with the active 
intent to empower. No science communication “problem” would exist except to determine 
what the best, most effective means of dissemination is. Under these circumstances, there is 
little need to clearly distinguish between empowering and strategic messages; wise people who 
are “properly” informed will sort it out and make the choices we expect—that is, they will opt 
for whatever S&T we are offering. Of course, S&T is not always an unmitigated good, and 
people are not always wise, so this is a very Pollyannaish position.  
 Even if S&T in the abstract were always good and “ordinary” people were always wise, 
specific developments in S&T clearly can be more compatible with some values than with 
others, and different specific developments may vary in terms of how compatible they are with 
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particular value systems (or, at a minimum, how compatible they appear to be with particular 
value systems). Since, in pluralistic democracies, values vary—something we strive to 
appreciate, along with autonomous decision making—we have every reason to be wary of top-
down strategic communication (about S&T or about anything else), even if engaged in for 
people’s “own good.”  
 Does morality, then, depend on motivation here? It is not irrelevant. It is one thing to 
empower people to make informed choices about whether to be vaccinated, for example. It is 
quite another to—in effect—force them, or perhaps we should say coerce them, by the 
effective use of persuasive or propagandistic communication, to be vaccinated. I am quite 
willing to assume here that the underlying S&T about the positive effects of vaccination and 
the low levels of risk involved is entirely correct. Rather, the issue is one of undermining 
individual autonomy and whether our commitment, as citizens of a value-pluralistic 
democracy, to preserving individual decision-making autonomy overrides our commitment, as 
(say) public health workers, government officials, or doctors, to preserve their health through 
top-down means. And this may be a “slippery slope” situation, i.e., a situation in which making 
an exception for preserving health (after all, this appears to be a near-universal value) would 
facilitate us making other future exceptions that might be much more problematic. 
 Would it be all right if we could escape this quandary by slipping in and vaccinating 
people (and their children) while they slept, without their knowledge and consent? Medical 
ethics says not, under the doctrine of “informed” consent. Ideally, what one hopes for is that 
people will understand the science well enough to freely give consent to whatever is in their 
own, albeit value-laden, interests. But in the back of our minds, it is very tempting to assume 
that if only they understood the science, they would make the same decision that we would 
make in their shoes. As human beings and members of a particular culture, it is very difficult 
for us to fully grasp that other human beings, members of slightly different cultures, in 
possession of all the same facts, would make different decisions. This is all just another form 
of the deficit model, in reality. But let’s also be honest with ourselves: the significant 
investment being made in nanotechnology education through science centers, experiments in 
public consultation about nano, and the intensive study of public opinion about nano would not 
be considered successful, in science policy circles, if the populace were ultimately to decide 
that nano is too risky, too unnatural, or simply too expensive to tolerate.  
 At the same time, education of “ordinary” people to make wise decisions as either 
consumers or citizens presumably seeks to increase autonomy, rather than engineering a 
particular opinion outcome. Science communication should ideally maximize the information 
individuals are able to bring to bear on these decisions. This largely “bottom-up” purpose 
necessarily presupposes that people might, under some circumstances, wisely opt against 
something in S&T that they are being offered—whether they perceive it as being too expensive 
or too risky, in proportion to benefits, or as violating their ethical principles or threatening their 
values. Education and information help “arm” people against making poor decisions driven by 
such factors as unfounded fears, failure to understand benefits, poor understanding of 
probabilities (as applied to, say, risks), or blind trust (or distrust) in a certain type of 
spokesperson. An underlying assumption of the move toward enhancing deliberative 
democracy for S&T choices is that people are indeed capable of making good decisions, given 
appropriate information and education, as was famously argued by John Dewey (1927). This 
does not mean only favorable opinions, however, else the entire exercise loses much of its 
meaning.  
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 Yet attempts to provide information and education to consumers and citizens in the 
hopes they will make better “bottom-up” decisions can be and often are undertaken for the 
purpose of encouraging a particular kind of decision, or even a specific, particular decision—
some sort of predetermined conclusion—up to and including accepting or rejecting some form 
of science, or a particular technology, that the communicator (or their employer) believes 
should be evaluated exactly so. Like consumer choices, this can happen without much thought, 
involving the unexamined assumption that more information and education will lead to a more 
pro-science attitude. Indeed, many in the science, science policy, and science communication 
communities assume that this is the case, and sometimes it may actually be true. This is not 
always true, however, and the unwarranted assumption that it is always and necessarily true 
that information and communication about science will result in more support for science is 
exactly the assumption underlying the by-now-familiar “deficit model” of science 
communication mentioned above, which the community of science communication and science 
studies scholars has roundly rejected (in favor of the “engagement” model, in which many of 
the same problems certainly appear to be embedded).  
 Other “top-down” communication efforts are guided by a more explicit specific 
purpose. Advertisers seek to have products adopted. Both doctors and health communicators 
typically seek to have healthy choices adopted (one hopes so, anyway). And scientists, research 
institutions, universities, major journals, scientific societies, and government agencies usually 
release scientific information with more specific intent than simply educating the public; they 
seek to “sell” themselves as institutions, science itself as an enterprise, and what they may 
genuinely believe is the best science policy. This is, to be sure, a continuum; the distinction 
between “top-down” strategic communication and “bottom-up” informational efforts, while 
analytically useful, is not always black and white in practice. 
 As individual consumers and citizens, sometimes we cannot be sure how to evaluate the 
available information: We aren’t sure whether we are the victims of corporate “greenwashing,” 
for example, or whether a politician is sincere (and not misguided) when he or she promises to 
fix our economy, or whether a product or service that we are attracted to and that some entity is 
promoting to us will turn out to have a high risk of harmful unforeseen consequences, perhaps 
even a known likelihood that is being ignored, if not actively covered up. And, of course, 
organizations trying to sell the idea that we should reject certain kinds of S&T, or S&T more 
generally, can also be misleading us (and even themselves) as to the consequences. This kind of 
reflexive consumer and citizen awareness is a crucial component of science literacy, what I 
would like to call “critical” science literacy. How do we distinguish transparent truth from 
propaganda efforts, especially in technical areas characterized by great uncertainty, emerging 
evidence, and communication almost universally motivated by institutional self-interest? An 
awareness of this challenge—a critical awareness of the potentially propagandistic character of 
much, possibly all, science communication—is itself an important facet of (critical) science 
literacy.  
 Journalism students have often been taught that the reason all sides of a controversy 
deserve representation is to create an open “marketplace of ideas” in which intelligent 
information consumers will make wise choices to separate truth from lies. For some critics, this 
was never sufficient assurance that democracy would work. Traditional newspaper journalism 
was always driven by source interests and business considerations, as well as by professional 
ethics and standards; news has been sold just like other products. Today’s “newest” 
journalism—that is, journalism in the new media world—is if anything even more blatantly 
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commercial in its orientation. At the same time, good journalism continues, and good science 
journalism is still available—perhaps even more available than in the “old media” world, at 
least to those who actively seek it out. The problem is not now solely one of information 
sufficiency or availability, if it ever was; it is more one of information overload and 
discernment, again requiring a more critical science literacy than ever before.  
 Scholars and strategists who suggest we can resolve “the problem” of science 
communication by appropriately “framing” science or by developing the “magic bullet” 
message that will persuade the masses that the science behind climate change, vaccination, 
evolution, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and so on is sound seem to have given up on the 
“marketplace” altogether. But theirs is a “top-down” solution to a “bottom-up” problem, and 
one that could only be counted on to work well if their message were the only one available. 
Yes, it is a good thing to remind people that science is relevant to their everyday lives (to rely, 
that is, on messages and frames that resonate with people’s values). But one can only take this 
so far: it is neither desirable nor possible, and probably would not be effective, to restrict the 
flow of information to a particular set of views, whether about a controversy involving science 
or anything else. In an open society, even the most cleverly crafted pro-science message will 
have to compete with other ideas. This limits the potential influence of “framing.” 
 Unless we abandon the notion of democratic resolution of differences altogether, at 
least for scientific and technical issues, and embrace instead Walter Lippmann’s (1922) idea 
that citizens are neither interested in policy nor capable of considering it intelligently, 
information restriction is not desirable. Unless we retreat to a sort of information 
totalitarianism in which only persuasive messages representing one side of things are available, 
information restriction is not possible—and the great democratic potential of new media, once 
widely touted but now seemingly lost in the stunning realization that traditional journalism is 
disappearing, lies in the idea that everyone now has a voice. A “marketplace of ideas” may be 
necessary for democracy, even if not sufficient to protect it. And we have known since Carl 
Hovland’s World War II experimental research program on propaganda (see Hovland, 
Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949) that one-sided messages are not very believable in most 
circumstances anyway.  
 Is there ever an exception—a situation where encouraging critical examination of 
claims about science might have disastrous effects for society? Indeed, this may have been 
partly what motivated the debates characterized as the “science wars”: If scholars dare to 
encourage critical reflection about the social character of science, are we risking another Dark 
Age when science was rejected, even forgotten? Not only the vaccination controversy, but 
other controversies—most notably that surrounding climate change—remind us of this 
dimension of our dilemma, the possibility that ignorance might yet snuff out what Carl Sagan 
(1996) called our “candle in the dark” (). In short, it might kill us—all of us. It would take a 
crystal ball to figure this out, but on balance, it seems that the path forward is reasonably well-
lit, and that retreat back along this path (the road toward information restriction, in other 
words) is not the best choice.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This essay is particularly concerned with nanotechnology as a case in point. In fact it’s a 
relatively easy case. Popular objections to nano are still muted. New experiments in public 
consultation, joint inquiry by humanists and scientists, and extensive and intensive public 
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education efforts probably should not take credit for this fact; nanotechnology does not seem to 
have the intensity of cultural resonance that came with bio (Priest, 2011). It also seems likely 
that a good many of the public engagement activities we’ve promoted have an element of 
“preaching to the converted”: absent active controversy, the most engaged, both among 
scientists and among “ordinary” people, are undoubtedly those already enthusiastic about the 
underlying S&T itself—an actively curious but supportive public. Nevertheless, the current 
“great experiment” surrounding nanotechnology and the public has certainly helped us to 
refine our toolkit of best practices for encouraging public consideration of new developments 
in science.  
 Yet one has to wonder whether we are tackling the most difficult dimensions of 
nanotechnology, even if it’s an easy case. By considering narrowly either the S&T itself, or 
scenarios that imagine a distant future, to what extent are we “whitewashing” 
nanotechnology’s tangible present issues—its environmental ramifications, worker and 
consumer health risks, or the social distribution of benefits from public investment? The toolkit 
we have been building may be too heavy on strategies for fostering public enthusiasm and too 
light on strategies for encouraging critical awareness. If critical science literacy is what we 
really need, how do we build this? Our “next generation” toolkit needs to tackle this goal. 
Getting people to consider the benefits and risks of nanotechnology may be just a “dry run” for 
getting people to come to grips with the benefits and risks of tomorrow’s S&T more 
generally—or the collective influence of the S&T industries that while daily saving our lives 
may also be destroying our environment.  
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